



Director of
Central
Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily

Tuesday
26 January 1982


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POLAND: Jaruzelski's Program

Premier Jaruzelski in his speech yesterday to the parliament defended the decision to impose martial law and claimed that restrictions would be eased by the end of February, if the situation remains calm. [redacted]

Jaruzelski said some restrictions will remain in effect in key industries. He asserted that the number of people interned has declined and implied that those still in custody will be released only if they sign loyalty oaths promising not to resume "antisocialist" activities. He indicated that military authorities will proceed at their own pace in dismantling martial law. [redacted]

1/2 The population was reassured that there would be no return to the previous highly centralized, corrupt system. Jaruzelski reaffirmed his government's support for economic reform, laid out measures aimed at streamlining the bureaucracy, and pledged "social justice" for all. He criticized the US sanctions, expressed hope that the US will adopt a more realistic policy, and applauded Western countries who resisted pressure to impose sanctions. [redacted]

Comment: Jaruzelski's promises for economic and bureaucratic reform and greater consultation will fall on skeptical ears. Poles often have heard promises of government reform, only to see entrenched party and government bureaucracies ignore such directives. They also will remember that only Solidarity was able to force change on the system. [redacted]

Military Activity

The military situation in Poland continues to show signs of returning to levels of activity observed before the imposition of martial law. Normal training activity by Polish air and ground forces is again being carried out. The other Warsaw Pact military forces also appear to be conducting routine activity. [redacted]

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USSR-US: Gromyko-Haig Meeting

Soviet expectations regarding the meeting today between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Haig--already lower following the imposition of Western sanctions--probably have declined further with the downgrading of its length and scope.

The idea of a US-Soviet summit meeting this year, however, recently has been given renewed emphasis by the Soviets in public and in private.

Comment: Soviet hopes of what the meeting would accomplish were probably raised following President Reagan's speech on arms control in November, the opening of INF talks, and the President's public reference to a possible summit meeting in 1982. Moscow, however, sees subsequent events relating to Poland as strengthening strains of "ideological" resoluteness in Washington against the influence of advocates of a more "pragmatic" approach.


Gromyko is likely to take an unyielding approach. He will contend that US toughness will only lead to a similar Soviet response.

Nonetheless, Gromyko will seek to obtain a reading of the current US mood and intent on several key issues. He said upon his arrival at Geneva yesterday he would not discuss Poland, but he probably will want to know what conditions would lead to additional Western sanctions on Poland and what could bring about an easing of existing ones.

Gromyko will be especially interested in any US flexibility on INF. He probably will push for talks to begin and will defend the value of the SALT II Treaty; he may, however, hold out promise of serious consideration for new US proposals on issues such as arms reductions and verification measures. He also may probe US attitudes on a summit meeting later this year.


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
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
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
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ETHIOPIA: Offensive in Eritrea

1 The government is continuing preparations for its largest
2 offensive against the Eritrean secessionists in two years, but its
efforts probably will be little more successful than previous
ones. []

1 Chairman Mengistu believes the time is right to
try to end the 20-year rebellion by military force. He
is convinced the guerrillas are seriously weakened by
internecine fighting and Sudanese restrictions on their
activity. []

1 Addis Ababa is able to concentrate its attention
on the north because it has the upper hand over Somali
insurgents in the Ogaden. The Army has committed three
2 additional divisions--including one shifted from the
3 Ogaden--and the Air Force has moved MIG-23 fighter-
bombers and MI-24 helicopter gunships to the airbase
at Asmara for the offensive. The Army also has begun
limited sweep operations, and some skirmishes with rebel
forces have already occurred. []

1 Comment: Even though Soviet advisers probably
again are on the scene, Addis Ababa's forces will be
hampered by low morale, an inefficient logistic system,
and vulnerable supply lines. []

1 The guerrillas, who have withstood previous attacks,
have had ample time to prepare for the offensive. More-
over, insurgents in adjoining Tigre Province are aiding
the Eritrean guerrillas. Even if the Ethiopians capture
the remaining rebel-held town of Nakfa--a symbolic
objective of the offensive--the guerrillas will be able
to hold on to most of the countryside. []

1 Although the offensive will place new burdens on
the economy, failure to break the rebellion would have
few significant internal repercussions. Mengistu has
involved key military officials in the offensive, and he
would have little trouble finding scapegoats for another
failure. []

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④ SUDAN: Vice President Fired

1/2 The removal yesterday by President Nimeiri of First Vice President and Defense Minister Khalil from all his posts could touch off a major power struggle. [redacted]

Nimeiri's precipitate action comes on the heels of meetings with senior military leaders. [redacted]

[redacted] Nimeiri told 1/2 the US Charge yesterday that reports of his imminent resignation were untrue. [redacted]

2 Comment: Khalil has considerable support among senior Army officers, and some of them could decide that it is time to move against Nimeiri. The extent of the President's strength is uncertain, but it has been slipping. An attempt to remove him could result in clashes between units loyal to him and those backing Khalil. [redacted]

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USSR-ITALY: Attack on Italian Communist Leadership

Moscow's sweeping condemnation of the Italian Communist Party leadership falls short of "excommunication."

The Soviets, in an editorial on Sunday in *Pravda*, accused party leaders of using events in Poland as a pretext for "inadmissible and unjust denigration" of the achievements of "socialism." The article contended that the leadership's "opportunistic and revisionist" stance represents a renunciation of the party's links with the socialist vanguard.

Comment: Moscow apparently decided that the criticisms by the Italian party leaders had become intolerable at a time when the USSR was already on the defensive because of Western reaction to events in Poland. The editorial's tone also indicates that the leadership had struck a sensitive nerve by questioning the viability of Soviet-style "socialism" at a time of economic difficulties in the USSR.

1/2
The article does not, however, match the past harsh Soviet criticism of the Chinese Party or equal the Cominform's expulsion of the Yugoslav Party in 1948. By carefully differentiating between the Italian Party's leadership and the rank and file, Moscow intends to galvanize its supporters in the party into effective opposition to the leadership.

Party Chief Berlinguer and Central Committee dissident Cossutta will each seek to use Moscow's broadside to woo the 25 percent or more of the rank and file that traditionally leans toward Moscow. Berlinguer is likely to respond that the attack proves the Soviets are not able to carry on a dialogue based on "equality and mutual respect." He may even argue that Moscow's attitude in this instance is symptomatic of the malaise that set the stage for the problems in Poland.

Cossutta, on the other hand, probably hopes to rally a large enough following to force his colleagues to adopt a position more in tune with the Soviets.

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TURKEY: Pessimism About Eradicating Terrorism

The military government evidently has made little progress toward eradicating terrorism, and its tough efforts to reduce extremist activity could contribute to the deterioration of Ankara's relations with Western Europe.

Meanwhile, the imprisonment of large numbers of suspects--about 30,000 so far--and the slow pace of mass trials involving seemingly undemocratic procedures have strengthened the impression in Western Europe that the generals run a repressive regime.


Comment: Turkish military and civilian authorities have claimed consistently that they have broken the terrorist movement and are on the verge of eliminating it in the large cities.

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West European criticism of the military government will come to the fore during the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly this week, when continued Turkish membership in the Council of Ministers will be debated. The condemnation of Turkey last week by the European Parliament--the EC's assembly--probably will not have a major impact on the Council's debate. The vote was close and taken with few members present, so that the majority for the resolution represented only 13 percent of the membership.


Immediate expulsion of Turkey from the Council appears unlikely because some members apparently prefer to continue efforts to influence the Turks from within the Council. Denmark and possibly other West European countries, however, probably will bring charges of human rights violations against Ankara in the European Commission of Human Rights.

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
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TANZANIA-USSR: Deterioration in Relations

1-4 Tanzanian officials are concerned over recent Soviet attempts--aimed at increasing the USSR's presence in Dar es Salaam--to skirt immigration procedures to bring in more personnel than their limited aid program warrants. Friction between Tanzanian military officers and their Soviet advisers also is increasing because of the sale of some obsolete Soviet military equipment to Tanzania. In addition, the heavyhanded behavior of Soviet diplomats, the expulsion of the entire Tanzanian Embassy staff in Moscow, and the reluctance of the Soviets to explain the recent death of a Tanzanian student in the USSR have contributed to the steady decline in relations over the past year.

Comment: Despite these problems, Tanzania probably will continue to rely on the Soviets for military aid.

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KAMPUCHEA: Coalition Proposal Rejected

Democratic Kampuchean leaders yesterday formally rejected the two-month-old proposal by Singapore for a loose coalition among the three major Kampuchean resistance groups. Democratic Kampuchea suggested that the groups meet again to try to establish a coalition government based on the principles that emerged last fall from a series of tripartite talks. Two key principles are equal sharing of power at all levels and consensus on all significant coalition decisions.

1-4

Comment: Democratic Kampuchea remains unwilling to subordinate itself to another political entity, particularly when its guerrilla forces provide the only effective resistance in Kampuchea. By requesting further talks, Democratic Kampuchea is trying to avoid a complete breakdown in negotiations. Such a development would reduce ASEAN's willingness to maintain its political support of Democratic Kampuchea and could weaken the group's hold on its seat at the UN.

13

BOLIVIA: Economic Pressures

The Torrelío government has failed to meet the terms of its debt rescheduling agreement, but international bankers have granted a third waiver to avoid pushing the country into default. Bolivia has until 15 April to implement economic austerity measures that will satisfy IMF requirements for financial assistance. President Torrelío's search for outside assistance has been unsuccessful thus far despite a personal appeal for funds to Argentine President Galtieri and similar approaches to US officials.

1-3

Comment: Torrelío is leery of the political consequences of a new economic program. Some of his economic advisers fear that several suggested remedies could add to the country's economic woes. Others are concerned that opponents of the regime would try to capitalize on expected popular resistance to the measures.

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MADAGASCAR: Alleged Coup Attempt

The Malagasy Government yesterday announced that it had put down a South African - backed coup attempt. Several high-ranking military officers and some Church leaders reportedly have been arrested. [redacted]

Comment: It is not yet clear that a coup attempt has actually taken place. [redacted]

[redacted] The arrests may be related to a communique issued by Catholic bishops in November that was highly critical of the government. Worsening food shortages, simmering student unrest, and the conflict between the Church and the state make renewed civil unrest likely and provide fertile ground for coup plots against President Ratsiraka's regime. [redacted]

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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NATO - WARSAW PACT: MBFR Talks

The Soviets recently proposed the creation of a working group to draft points of agreement at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna. They probably believe this offer, while not giving new life to the negotiations that resumed on Thursday, will complement other Soviet "peace" proposals and support Moscow's ostensible commitment to the full range of arms control negotiations.

As spokesmen for the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets are seeking to counter Western proposals and put the West on the defensive. Their latest proposal follows two earlier initiatives by the East in 1980.

For several years, Eastern negotiators have refused to satisfy the West on longstanding disputes. These include the East-West disparity in numbers for Eastern ground force strength in Central Europe and the nature and scope of notification and verification measures of troop reductions made by each side in that area.

The Coming Round

The East is likely to reiterate past arguments on these issues and not offer compromises. Eastern negotiators want to assess the outcome of the US review of MBFR strategy before they offer any new substantive approaches.

The East's representatives realize that Western acceptance of the latest proposal is unlikely. They evidently hope, however, that it and previous Eastern proposals will urge the West to make the next move.

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Uncertainty over Poland and the CSCE review session in Madrid probably will reinforce Soviet resistance to making any concessions now. The USSR would be reluctant to accept the constraints any MBFR accord structured along current Western lines would impose on its military forces until Soviet leaders are sure that additional Soviet troops will not be needed in Poland. Moreover, as long as European confidence-building measures encompassing Soviet territory are at issue in CSCE, Moscow will continue to reject Western MBFR notification and verification proposals. []

Moscow's Options

The Eastern proposal to begin drafting points of agreement in MBFR will be used to strengthen the "peace" offensive in Europe. The USSR might reinforce this offensive with renewed emphasis on its proposals to freeze NATO and Warsaw Pact troop strength in Central Europe while MBFR talks continue and to limit conventional armaments in any eventual accord. []

In addition, the Soviets have expressed a vague willingness to include "short-range" nuclear weapons in MBFR negotiations. If this proposal is publicized, it would complement President Brezhnev's earlier offer regarding a moratorium on introducing additional INF systems in Europe. []

This latest MBFR proposal shows Moscow's need to deal with European fears of conventional arms inferiority at a time when NATO and the US are contending that new Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles are upsetting the European nuclear balance. It also offers an opportunity to demonstrate that the USSR is prepared to negotiate across the full range of arms control initiatives. []

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